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THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING POLITICAL: UNDERSTANDING
U.S. SUPREME COURT'S APPROACH TO AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION IN EDUCATION

-Gerald N. Rosenberg
INTRODUCTION
In this article, I examine the evolving jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court's
decisions on the constitutionaliry of affirmative action with specific focus on
education. Starting with the Bakke decision in 1978 ' and continuing through
the Universiry of Michigan cases in 2003,' Parents Involved in 2007' and Fisher
in 20 13,' the Supreme Court has applied different constitutional standards with
different results. I will argue that the best, if not the only, way to understand this
evolving doctrine is ro focus on the political commitments of the justices, the
role of interest groups, the voter alignments of the Democratic and Republican
parties and white elite and public opinion, more generally. I will argue that the
text of the Constitution itself is of little use in understanding how it will be
interpreted and how that interpretation will change.
The contribution of the paper is manifold. First, by way of background, it
presents and discusses many of the leading cases interpreting the Equal Protection
Clause of the 14'h Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. It then turns, secondly,
to the affirmative action decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, starting in the
1970s and continuing through 2013. Third, it summarizes and applies the
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Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.1 , 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
Fisher v. University of Texas, 570 U.S. (20 13).
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leading social science approaches to undemanding judicial decision-making,
including the attitudinal model, the strategic actor model, and the institutional!
public opinion model. Finally, it makes what, I believe, is a powerful case that, in
order to understand the jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court in politically
contentious issues, scholars must take politics into account.

CONSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND AND 19TH CENTURY CASES
The starting point for any discussion of affirmative action is the 14,h
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The so-called Equal Protection Clause
of Section I states, "no state shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws." Enacted in 1868 as part of the post-Civil
War attempt to protect the newly freed slaves, these sixteen words have been
the focus of intense scrutiny. What does it mean to deny a person the "equal
protection of the laws"? Surely, it doesn't mean that all people need to be treated
identically. Laws make distinctions between people all the time. Children are
treated differently than adults, wealthy people pay taxes at higher rates than the
poor, and some businesses are regulated in ways that others are not. The Equal
Protection Clause was not intended to make such distinctions unconstitutional.
In order to understand how the Supreme Court has approached the question
of the constitutionality of affirmative action, it is necessary to understand its
basic approach to race-based discrimination and the Equal Protection Clause.
In 1873, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, s the U.S. Supreme Court first turned
its attention to the meaning of the Equal Ptotection Clause. Discussing the
adoption of the 13'" Amendment which prohibited slavery, the 14'h Amendment,
and the 15'" Amendment which guaranteed newly free (male) slaves the right
to vote, the Court noted that they were "events almost toO recent to be called
history"6 which were "fresh within the memory of us all."? The Amendments
had a "unity of purpose'" to protect the newly freed slaves: "the one pervading
5
6
7
B

83 U.S. 36 (1872).
!d a t 7 1.
!d at 68.
!d at 67.
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purpose fou nd in them all... [isl the freedom of the slave race.'" The "obvious
purpose" of the 13,h Amendment, the Court wrote, was to "forbid all shades
and conditions ofAfrican slavery. "10 Bur, on irs own, ir wasn'r enough to prorect
their rights: "the condition of the slave race would, without further protection
of the Federal government, be almost as bad as it was before."" The Court
continued, " . . .something more was necessary in the way of constitutional
protection to the unfortunate race who had suffered so much."I2Thus, the 14th
Amendment was ratified. But, it, too, was "inadequate for the protection of
life, liberty, and ptoperty, without which freedom to the slave was no boon. "I '
So, the 15th Amendment was added to the u.s. Constitution. Thus, the clear
understanding of these Civil War Amendments, including the 14'" Amendment,
was that they were intended to help and protect African-Americans.
Constitutional ptovisions, even majestic ones, don't exist in a vacuum. They
are interpreted, and can only be interpreted by people living in a particular
place and time. Although the Civil War Amendments were ratified by 2/3rds
majorities in each House of Congress and by 3/4s of the State legislatures, as
required by Article V of the U .S. Constitution,14 white Americans were at best
ambivalent about and, at worst, hostile to guaranteeing equal rights to AfricanAmericans. For example, when the U.S. Congress was debating what became
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 guaranteeing equal treatment in public places,
the Chicago Tribune wrote, "[ils it not time for the colored race to stop playing
baby?"15 Overcoming opposition, Congress passed the Act. Section 1 held that:

9

id.at71.

10
II

/d. at 69.
fd. at 70.

12

fd.

13

fd.at71.

14

For an argument that the congressional vote was illegitimate because senators from
southern states were excluded. and the votes of state legislatures were coerced , see Bruce

Ackerman,

15

we the Peopl.: Transformations (1998).

AI quoted in

BARRY FRIEDMAN , THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTlTI.TfION

147 (2009).
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''all pmons within the jurisdiction ofthe United States shall be entitled
to the foll and equal enjoyment ofthe accommodations, advantages,
focilities, and privileges ofinns, public conveyances on land or water,
theaters, and other places ofpublic amusement; subject only to the
conditions and limitations established by law. and applicable alike
to citizens ofevery race and color, regardless ofany previous condition
ofservitude. "1 6
In the Civil Rights Cases of 1883." the Court heard a challenge to the
constitutionality of the Act. The case brought together challenges to the law
from the five states of California. Kansas. Missouri. New York. and Tennessee.
In each of these states. African-Americans had been denied entrance to
places covered under the Act. and they sued to have the Act enforced. The
geographic range of the states. including the stalwart Union States of New
York and California. is revealing ofwidespread white antipat y to guaranteeing
African-Americans equal rights. For many white Americans. reintegrating
white southerners back into rhe United States was the paramount goal. Former
U.S . President Rutherford Hayes wtote to U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice
Waite in July 1882. stressing the importance of maintaining the friendship of
white Southerners: "With that sentiment right. our cause will advance. with that
sentiment wrong. all our efforts willfoil." The Chief Justice responded two days
later: "I agree with you entirely as to the necessity of keeping public sentiment
at the South in our favor."18 Thus. it should be no surprise that in its decision
the Supreme Court. by a vote of 8-1. interpreted the Act narrowly so as not
to apply ro privately owned establishments. Since virtually all "inns. public
conveyances ... theaters. and other places of public amusemem" were privately
owned, this decision rendered the Act insignificant. Justice Bradley. writing for
the 8-Justice majority. reflected the lack of suppOrt among white Americans
for protecting the rights of African-Americans:

"When a man has emergedfrom slavery. and. by the aid ofbeneficent
legislation, has shaken offthe inseparable concomitants ofthat state. there

16

17
18

18 S,a,. 335 (1875).
109 U.S. 3 (1883) .
As quoud in FRIEDMAN, Supra nore 15 at 149.
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must be some stage in the progress of his el£vation when he takes
the rank ofa mere citizen and ceases to be the special fovorite ofthe
laws.. . "19
The decision in the Civil Rights Cases reflected the lack of support of the federal
government, and white America, for protecting the rights ofAfrican-Americans.
With white majorities uninterested in protecting their rights, and the U.S.
federal government unwilling to act, states were in effect free to discriminate on
the basis of race. While racial discrimination existed everywhere in the U.S., it
was particularly enforced in the South. In the southern states of the Civil War
Confederacy, racial apartheid systems were created, backed by the authority
of the state and the force of white vigilante violence. The distinguished U.S.
historian, C. Vann Woodward, describes the situation facing African-Americans
in the late 19'h century in poignant language:

"Blacks watched with despair while the foundations for the jim Crow
[apartheid] system were laid and the walls of segregation mounted
around them. Their disenchantment with the hopes based on the Civil
~r amendments and the Reconstruction laws was nearly complete
by 1890. The American commitment to equality, solemnly attested
by three amendments to the Constitution and elaborate civil rights
acts, was virtually rep,uiiated. What had started as a retreat in 1877,
when the last Federal troops were pulled out ofthe South. had turned
into a rout. Northern radicals and liberals had abandoned the cause;
the courts had rendered the Constitution helpless; the Republican
Party had forsaken the cause it had sponsored. A tide of racism was
mounting in the country unopposed. Blacks held no less than jive
national conventions in 1890 to consider their plight. but all they could
do was to pass resolutions ofprotest and conftss their helplessness. '20
There is no better judicial example of this abandonment of protecting the rights
ofAfrican-Americans than the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Plessyv. Ferguson
in 1896.21 In the years 1887-189 I , eight southern states passed laws requiring

19

Supra note 17 at 25.

20

C . Vann Woodward, Th( Cast ofthe Louisiana Travtla in QUARRELS THAT HAVE SHAPED
THE CONSTITUTION 157-74, 159 Oohn A. Garraty (ed.),1962).

21

163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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railroads to segregate passengers on account of race. The Louisiana statute of
1890 required railroads to provide "equal. but separate" accommodation for
blacks and whites. 22 For the most part, the railroads complied with the separate
requirement of the law but not the equal one. Homer Plessy, an AfricanAmerican, was arrested for violating the Act. He challenged e constitutionality
of the law under both the 13'hand 14,h Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
In contrast to the holding of the Civil Rights Cases, the denial of equal treatment
by the railroads was pursuant to state law. Their actions were not those of
private individuals who the Court had held were beyond the reach of the federal
government. Rather, they were actions required by state law This should have
made it easy for the U.S. Supreme Court to follow the precedent it set in the
Civil Rights Cases and invalidate this and other "separate, bllt equal" laws.
Co nstitution of 1896 was not the Constitution of 1868 when the 14'h
Amendment was adopted. The words hadn't changed, bur both white public and
elite opinion had changed. Thus, the Court found the case easy. With only one
dissenting Justice, the Court held the Louisiana stature constitutional. Writing
for the Court, Justice Brown drew a new distinction, not between private and
state action as in the Civil Rights Cases, bur between social an political equality.
Although the "object of the [14"'] Amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the
absolute equality of the two races before the law," Justice Brown wrote, "in the
natu,e ofthings, it could not have been intended to abolish distinctions based
upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality... "" In
deciding whether legislation violates the requirements of the 14,hAmendment,
the Court held that "there must necessarily be a large discret ion on the part of
the legislature." The state, the Court held, "is at liberty to act with reference to
the established usages, customs, and traditions of the people ... " 24 In response
to Plessy's argument that, as the Court put it, "the enforced separation of
the two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority," the C ourt
disingenuously responded, "[i]f this be so , it is not by reason of anything found
22

!d.

23

!d. at 544.
!d. at 550.

24
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in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses to put that construction
it. "25

upon

In the discussion above, I suggested that the Court was following white elite and
public opinion. How often does the Court decide cases, more or less, in keeping
with public opinion? In his classic historical study of the behavior of the U.S.
Supreme Court, Robert G . McCloskey argued that the U.S. Supreme Court
"learned to be a political institution and to behave accordingly. "26 What he meant
by this was that lacking enforcement powers, the Court learned that to be effective
it pretty much had to keep its decisions in line with public opinion. At bottom,
the Court realized the truth of what Alexander Hamilton wrote in Federalist #78
long ago: that it lacks power. The Court, Hamilton wrote, has "no influence
over either the sword or the purse ... and must ultimately depend upon the aid
of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments."27 Thus, McCloskey
wrote, "UJ udicial ideas of the good society can never be too far removed from the
popular ideas. "" Throughout its history, he found that the "Court has seldom
lagged far behind or forged far ahead of America,"" and "seldom strayed very
far from the mainstreams of American life. ",0 So, as the views of the American
public shifted, so did the opinions of the Court. For McCloskey, "the Court's
whole history can be viewed as a constant or, at least, repeated readjustment of
role to suit the circumstances of each succeeding judicial era."'1
A few years earlier, Robert Dahl published his famous article, "Decision-Making
in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a National Policy Maker."32 Examining
25

fdar 552. In his justifiably famous solo dissent, the former slave owner Justice Harlan
wrote, the "thin disguise of ,equal' accommodations [will] not mislead anyone, nor atone
for the wrong this day done." 163 U.S. 537,562 (1896) .

26

ROBERT G. McCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 261 (5,h Ed. 2010).

27

Hamilton, Thy Frdnalist No. 78, (CiinronRossiter ed. 1961). Available at the Avalon
Project. avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_cenrury/fed78.asp.

28

Jd. at 13.

29

[d. at 260-61.
[d. at 261.

30
31

32

[d. at 70.
Robert A. Dahl. Duision-Making in a D~mocracy: Thr Suprrmr Court as a National Policy
Makrr6J. PUB. L. 279 (195 7) .
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the history of the Supreme Court, Dahl concluded that "[b]y itself the Court
is almost powerless to affect the course of national policy."3l This was largely
because of the appointment process. Dahl calculated the avetage number of
months between appointments, finding it to be 22 months."Thus, historically,
on average, a one-term President would likely have two appointments, and a
two-term President would likely have four. Unless pteside ts choose poorly,
the new Justices would likely reflect the policy views of the President and the
political coalition that elected him. This meant, Dahl concluded, that "the
policy views dominant on the Court are never for long OUt of line with the
policy views dominant among the lawmaking majorities of the U.S. ""
In 2009, law professors Lucas A. Powe, Jr. , and Barry Friedman published books
that amplified and enlarged these arguments. Powe investigated the interests
and demands of political elites and how the Court works with them ro further
their interests. His "dominant theme" was that the "Court is a majoritarian
institution."" As Powe understands the role of the Court, it is to "harmonize
the Constitution with the demands of majoritarian politics."" Friedman focused
not on elites but on public opinion. His aim was to provide a "chtonicle of the
relationship between the popular will and the Supreme Court as it unfolded
over two-hundred-plus years of American history."" In doing so, he concludes
that what "history shows is assuredly not that Supreme Cou rt decisions always
are in line with popular opinion, but rather that they come into line with one
another over time."39

33
34

Id. at 294.
By 2013 the number of months between appointments has increased

to

30.5 months

for the 22 Justices appointed since 1957. This means that a onc-term president is likely
co have at least one appointment and a two-term president is likely [0 have two or three
appointments, rypically enough [0 sway the ideological direction of the Court.

35
36
37
38

Supra note 32 at 285.
LUCAS A. POWE, JR. , THE SU PREME COURT AND THE AMERICAN ELITE 1789-2008

B ARRY FRIEDMAN, THE W ILL OF THE PEOPLE:

How
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THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING Of THE CONSTITUTION
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ix (2009).

Id. at 350.
4 (2009).

!d. at 382.
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McCloskey, Dahl, Powe and Friedman understand the Court as a political
institution constrained by forces and actors in addition to the law. Their overall
explanation for the Court's opinions seems to describe well the decisions I have
discussed so far. When elite or white public opinion supported ptotecting the
rights of African-Americans, the Court upheld laws that did that and struck
down laws that didn't. Cases like the Slaughterhouse Cases illustrate this claim.
However, when elite or white opinion was hostile to African-Americans, so
was the Court. This is seen in the Civil Rights Cases and Plessy. And, as shall be
explained, when the white public and elites were torn , so was the Court (Bakke) .
This institutional/public opinion model appears to have explanatory power.

20TH CENTURY CASES

Brown v. Board ofEducation of Topeka, Kansas
In 1954, the U.S. Supreme COUrt issued a landmark decision that fundamentally
changed constitutional interpretation. At issue was whether state laws that
required racial segregation in public schools denied African-American children
the equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 14" Amendment. At the
time of the decision, the eleven states of the Civil War Confederacy enforced
such laws, as did the six states that bordered the region and Washington ,
D.C., the nation's capital. In addition, four other states allowed local racial
segregation. All of these jurisdictions operated racially segregated schools under
the "Separate-but-Equal" doctrine upheld in Plessy. The African-American
plaintiffs argued that while the schools were racially segregated, they were hartlly
equal. More importantly, they argued that separating African-Americans from
whites, regardless of whether the school facilities were equal , denied AfricanAmericans the equal protection of the laws.
A unanimous Supreme Court agreed . Writing for the Court, ChiefJustice Earl
Warren wtote, "to separate them [African-American school children] ftom
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their

9
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hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever

to

be undone. " ,10 Thus, the Court

concluded, " ...in the field of public education, the doctrine of 'separate bur
equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities are inh erently unequal.""
In effectively reversing the holding of Plessy v. Ferguson , the Court overturned
more than half a century of constitutional interpretation .
What led the Supreme Court to change its interpretation of tile Equal Protection
Clause? Its words had not changed, nor had other relevant provisions of the
Constitution. What had changed was elite white opinion and, to some extent,
white public opinion." The U.S . government urged the Court to fi nd racial
segregation in schools unconstitutional . In particular, the U.S. Department of
State, seeing the world through a Cold War lense, argued that racial segregation
made the U.S. look bad in its ideological battle with the Soviet Union" While
the justices struggled with how to decide the case,'4 in the end their decision was
unanimous. And, in recent decades, Brown was been praised across the political
spectrum. No serious politician, judge, or lawyer can reject Brown and expect to

40

347 U.S. 483, 494. Although this language repudiated Justice Brown's sta tement in

Pkssy th at racial segregation was nO( intended ( 0 instill a sense of inferiority in AfricanAmericans, the Court was careful not lO overtu rn (hat decisi on. No ting that Pussy dealt
with transportation, no t education (347 U.S. 483. 491 ), Chiefju,S tice Warren wrote only
that "[aJ ny language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this findin g is rejected" (347 U.S.
483,494 -95).

41

Id.at 495. T he language of the 14'h Amendment is a limitation on srate action. Thus. [he
holding did not apply to Washingto n, D.C., which is govern ed by federal as opposed to
state law. In the compa ni on case of Bolling v. Sharpe 347 U.S. 497 (I95 4), the Court
invalidaredsegrewrion in Was hington. D.C .. as well. In a very shorr opinion. a unanimous
Court held rhar 'racial segregation in theJublic schools of the Dtstrict of Columbia is a
denial of the due process oflaw guarantee by the Fifth Amendment [Q the Constitution"
(347 U.S. 497, 500 ( 1954)). Pointing [0 the jusr delivered Brown opinion, Chiefjusrice
Warren wrote thar "it wo uld be unthinkable that rhe same Const iturion woul d impose a
lesser duty on the Federal Government Ithan on the states]." (347 U.S . 497, 500 (1954)).

42

For a discussion of changes in race relations in the U.S. preced ing Brown , see Chapter 5,
The Current o/ History 157-169 in GERALD N. ROSENBERG, TH E H OLLOW Ho PE: CAN
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOC IAL C HANG E' (2"ded.) (2008).

43

For in -dep th discuss ion of the influence of the Cold War on racial segregarion and Brown
in particu lar. see Mary L. Dudziak, Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative 4 1 STANFORD
LAw REvtEW 61 (1988). Sf( a&o, MARY L. DUDZtAK, COLD WAn CML RIGHTS: RACE
AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACy(2000).

44

MICHAEL J. KLA RMAN , FROM JIM CROW T O C rvlL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND
THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 292-312 (2004).
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be taken seriously. Former law professor and later Reagan-appointed federal court
of appealsJudgeJ . Harvie Wilkinson put it this way in 1979: "Brown may be the
most important political, social, and legal event in America's twentieth-century
history. " 45 Fifteen years later, law professor Michael Klarman went even further,
writing that "constitutional lawyers and historians generally deem Brown v. Board
o[Education to be the most important United States Supreme Court decision of
the Twentieth Century and, possibly, of all time. " 46 With this background, I turn
now to consideration of the Court'S affirmative action jurisprudence.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: THE EARLY YEARS
Affirmative action in education in the United States involves the question of
whether background attributes such as race, gender, and ethnic origin can be
taken into account along with academic credentials in admissions decisions.
Among qualified applicants, is it an unconstitutional denial of equal protection
for a universiry to give preference ro applicants from minoriry groups who have
suffered, and may continue to suffer, from discrimination? U.S. society and
the Supreme Court have been struggling with this question since the 1970s.
In the period 1941-1963, U .S. presidents iss ued twelve Executive Orders
dealing with nondiscrimination and/or equal opportunity within the federal
government. For example, in June 1941 , President Roosevelt issued Executive
Order 8802, requiring that "there shall be no discrimination in the employment
of workers in defense industries or government because of race, creed, color, or
national origin ... "" Then, in 1964, the U.S. Congress passed, and President
Johnson signed into law, the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title VII of the Act made
it unlawful for any employer ro discriminate against "any individual because
of his race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ... "48 The clear aim of Title
VII was to stop discrimination against people of color.
45 J.

H ARV IE WILKINSON ,

III,

FROM BROWN TO ALEXANDER: TH E SUPREME COU RT AND

1954-19786 (1979).
Michael J. Klarman, How Brown Chang,d RoC( R'/.lI;ons: Th, Backlash ThrsiJ, 81 JOU RNAL
OF AMERICAN HISTORY (1994) .
Exec utive Order 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 Oune 27, 1941 ). Available al hnp,l/www.eeoc.
govleeoclhislOry/35rhft hclaw/eo-8802.html).
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 7, 42 U.s.c. § 2000e e[Seq (1 964).

SCHOOL INTEGRATION

46
47
48
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For many proponents of equality, Title VII, although important, was not
enough ro counter the negative effects of past discrimination and the ongoing
effects of current discrimination. In June 1965, President Johnson gave the
commencement address at Howard University, the historically black university
in Washington, D.C., chartered by the U .S. Congress in 1B67. In his speech,
he stressed the need to do more than guarantee freedom from discrimination:

"Butfreedom is not enough. You do not wipe away the scars ofcenturies
by saying: Now you are free to go where you want, and do tiS you desire,
tlnd choose the leaders you please.... You do not take a person who, for
years, htls been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring him up to
the starting line ofa race and then say, you are free to compete with
all the others," and still justly believe that you have been completely
foir... This is the next and the more profound stage of the battle for
civil rights. We seek not just freedom but opportunity. We seek not
just legal equity but human ability, not just equality as a right and a
theory, but equality as a foct and equality as a result. "49
As head of the Executive Branch, President Johnson used his position to
implement his vision of nondiscrimination. In Septembe r 1965, he issued
Executive Order 11246 50 requiring companies receiving contracts from the
federal government to take affirmative action to assure n n-discrimination.
And , in 1969 , me Department of Labor enforced, in effect, a hiring quota
under EO 11246. This so-called "Philadelphia Plan" was upheld by the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit in 1971. 51
President Johnson's image of racial minorities, particularly African-Americans,
as hobbled by centuries of discrimination was powerful. Universities in me
U.S. , especially me most prestigious ones, historically have been virtually all
white with only a handful of minority students. In terms (If elementary and
secondary education, African-Americans lagged behind white Americans in
49

50

Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965. YoU!,
Entry 301 , 635-640 (. Government Printing Office, Washington, D . C , 1966). Availabk
a l http: //www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/johnson/ archives. hom/speeches.hom/650604 .asp.
30 Fed. Reg. 12319 (Sept. 24, 1965).

51

Contractors Association of Eastern Pennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159

(3 rd cir. 1971).
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school completion rates, academic records and test scores, When President
Johnson delivered his Howard Universiry speech, many African-Americans
still attended schools that were 100% African-American, were under-funded,
lacked adequate facilities and resources, and often had poorly trained teachers .
In response to the passage of Tide VII as well as the Civil Rights Movement of
the 1960s, many universities began to make efforts to diversifY their student
bodies. One such was the medical school of the Universiry of California at Davis.
The medical school at the Universiry of California at Davis was founded
in 1968, Its first class of fifty students had neither African-Americans, nor
Mexican-American members, '2 Starting in the early 1970s, the facu lry adopted
a "special admissions program to increase the representation of "disadvantaged"
students in each Medical School class, " '3 In essence, 16 of the now 100 places
in the entering class were reserved for racial and ethnic minorities, From 197 11974, the special admission program resulted in the admission of 21 black
students and 30 Mexican-American students, while over the same period,
only 1 African-American and 6 Mexican-Americans were admitted under the
regular admissions program."
Allan Bakke was a white male who applied to, and was rejected by, the Davis
Medical School in both 1973 and 1974. "In both years, applicants were
admitted under the special program with grade point averages, MCAT scores
and benchmark scores significantly lower than Bakke's."" After his second
rejection, Bakke brought suit in California courts, arguing that he was den ied
admission on the basis of race in violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the
14,h Amendment,'6 The trial court agreed, finding that the special admission
Supra notel at 272.
53 Id.
54 Id. at 275.
52

55

!d. at 277. The "MCAT" (Medical College Admissions Test) was a test required of all
medical school applicants. The "benchmark" score was a compilation of ratings given to
each applicant by me admissions committee. Applicants w ith benchmark scores above a
designated level were offered admissio n.

56

Bakke also claimed that his rejection vio lated Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and
Section 1 of the California Constitution.
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program was a racial quota that violated the California and U.S. Constitutions
and federal law. The court held that the University could not take race into
account in making admissions decisions. 17 On appeal, the California Supreme
Court held that the Davis program denied Allan Bakke the equal protection of
the laws because it was not the least intrusive means of achieving the admittedly
compelling state interest of having more docrors from minority groups. The
decision was appealed to the U .S. Supreme Court.
In deciding whether a plaintiff has been denied equal protection , the U.S.
Supreme Court has developed three standards. The first, and most common,
is the rational relations test. This test holds that there is no denial of equal
protection if government action is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
purpose. Application of the rational relations test inevitably results in government
action being upheld.
fu early as 1938, the Court worried that rational relation was toO lax a standard

for evaluating govern mental action alleged to deny mi orities the equal
protection of the law. In the most famous footnote in Supreme Court histoty,
footnote four of US. v.Carolene Products Co.," Justice Stone wondered:

"whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation ofthose
politicalprocesses ordinarily to be relied upon to protect ml norities, and
which may callfor a correspondingly more searchingjudiclal inquiry. ""59
Six years later, Justice Black answered Justice Srone's query in the affi rmative,
writing for the Co urt that "all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights
of a single racial group are immediately suspect. ... [and] courts must subject
them to the most rigid scrutiny."60 fu this strict scrutiny standard developed,
when government action is challenged as denying a racial minori ty the equal
protection of the laws, a court asks whether the legislation is necessary to further

57
58
59
60

Supra note 1 at 279.
304 U. 5.144 (1938).
[d. a 152.
Koremarsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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a compelling governmental purpose or, sometimes, whether it is the least intrusive
means possible for achieving that purpose or is narrowly tailered. Traditionally,
with the exception of the Korematsu opinion which announced the strict
scrutiny test, no legislation to which the standard was applied was upheld. It
used to be said that the standard was strict in theory but fatal in fact . As we
shall see, this has changed.
Finally, as the women's movement challenged gender discrimination in the
United States, the Court was faced with the question of which standard to
apply to gender discrimination claims. After struggling with the issue for several
years , the Court adopted a third standard, the so-called intermediate standard
of review.6l When a law classifYing people on the basis of gender is challenged
as denying equal protection, the Co urt asks whether the law is substantially
related to the achievement of important governmental objectives.
The Bakke case presented the question of which standard the Court should
apply to evaluate the constitutionaliry of affirmative action. If it were to apply
rational relation, the Davis program would be upheld. On the other hand, if
it decided the applicable standard was strict scrutiny, as the California Supreme
Court thought it was, the affirmative action program would be struck down.
And, there was the possibiliry of applying the intermediate level scrutiny test
developed in gender discrimination cases.
The fact that made the choice of standard particularly challenging was that the
person alleging a denial of equal protection, Allan Bakke, was a white man , not
a racial minoriry! In formulating and applying the strict scrutiny standard, the
Court had focused on assessing claims that the challenged laws denied racial
minorities the equal protection of the laws. In developing the intermediate
scrutiny standard, the Court was focused on discrimination against women. 62
But, in this case, as in all affirmative action cases, race or gender is taken into
account to help, not burden, racial minorities and women. Should that matter?
61

Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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Discrimination against women was the Coun 's focus, eve n though cases like Craig v.
Boren were brought by a man .
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Should whites alleging a denial of equal protection on the basis of race be treated
the same as, or differently than, racial minorities alleging racial discrimination?
Was the 14'" Amendment adopted ro protect the rights of African-Americans
and other racial minorities or was its broad language applicable ro all people
rega rdless of race? These were difficult issues and the Bakke Court struggled
with them.
A few years before Bakke, in 1974, the Co urt had heard another affirmative
action case, DeFunis v. Odegaard. 63 The facts of this case were somewhat similar
to those of Bakke. At iss ue was a preferential admission pI n at the law school
of the University of Washington. In 197 1, a white male applicant, Marco
DeFunis, J r. , applied for admission and was subsequently rejected. He alleged
that under the preferential admission plan, the law school ad admitted racial
minorities with lower LSAT scores'" and grades. He filed suit, arguing that the
preferential admission plan discriminated against him on account of race in
violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14'" Amendment.
The trial court agreed with DeFunis and ordered him admitted to the law school.
The University ofWashington complied with the order but appealed the case. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington State held the preferential admissions
plan constitutional and reversed the trial court's decision. DeFunis, by this point
in his second year of law school, appealed to the U .S. Supreme Court.
By the time the case reached the U.S . Supreme Court, it was seen as having
national importance. More than two dozen amicus briefs were filed, representing
dozens of organizations. 6s The political breakdown of the amicus briefs was
revealing of the difficulty of the issue. It revealed the frayin g of the progressive
New Deal political coalition comprised of unions, civil rights groups and Jewish
groups. This coalition had provided the political support for laws such as Social
Security, the 1964 C ivil Rights Act, Food Stamps, Medicare and Medicaid.
63

4 16 U.S. 31 2 (1974).

64

The Law School Apti tude Test (LSAT ) is a national test required of all applicants to law
schooL
Supra nOte 63 3 13.
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While the overwhelming majority of amici argued for the constitutionality
of the affirmative action plan, the largest union in the COUntty, the American
Federation of Labor and Congress ofIndusrrial Organizations (AFL-CIO), as
well as several Jewish groups, joined with the conservative business group, the
Chamber of Commerce of the United States, to argue in support of DeFunis.
The U.S. Supreme Court heard oral argument in the case in February, 1974.
Two months later, on April 23, 1974, the Court announced its decision. The
Court held:

"Because the petitioner will complete his law school studies at the end
ofthe term for which he has now registered regardless ofany decision
this Court might reach on the merits ofthis litigation, we conclude
that the Court cannot, consistently with the limitations ofArt. III of
the Constitution, consider the substantive constitutional issues tendered
by the parties. '<>6
The Court punted! It held the case moot. Why, after accepting the case,
hearing oral argument, receiving dozens of amicus briefs, did the Court make
the embarrassing decision to decline to decide the substantive issue? Making
maners worse, when the case was filed, it was no secret that DeFunis was a
student at the University of Washington law school and was on track to graduate
in the spring of 1974. Yet, that didn't prevent the Court from agreeing to hear
the case-even though the Court has control over virtually all of irs docket.
The answer is likely that the justices were so splintered in their views that they
preferred to avoid deciding the case.
But, the Court couldn't avoid the issue for long, nor the intense interest it
engendered. In the Bakke case, nearly sixty amici briefs were filed representing
approximately one hundred organizations and individuals, the largest number
of such briefs ever filed in a Supreme Court case to this point.·' And this time
the Court produced an opinion, albeit a deeply fractured one. In an opinion
by Justice Brennan, four justices held that the correct constitutional standard ro
66
67

!d. at 319-20.
Interestingly, {he AFL-CIO did not file an amicus brief this time, reAecting the splits
within [he union movement over affirmative action.
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apply to affirmative action plans "designed to further remedial purposes" was the
intermediate level scrutiny standard 6 ' Applying this standard, the fou r justices
upheld the Davis plan, Four other justices, in an opinion by Justice Stevens,
didn't reach the constitutional issue, They held that the special admissions
program violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 196469 by "excluding Bakke
from the Medical School because of his race,"70 Thus, there were four votes
holding that neither the Constitution, nor legislation, prohi bited a university
from taking race into account in its admission decisions, and that under Tide
VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, a university could neverrake race into acco unt
in admissions,
This tie was broken by Justice Powell who agreed, in part, with each of the two
groups. Applying the strict scrutiny standard, Justice Powell rejected the Davis
plan. Its "fatal flaw," he wrote, was its racial quota, its "disreg rd of individual
righ ts as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. "71 This meant there were
five justices who held the Davis program unconstitutional, alheit for di fferent
reasons. However, he did find that the attainment of "a diverse student body"72
was constitutionally "compelling in the context of a university's admissions
program."73 In order ro achieve it, Justice Powell held that, wile a university
couldn't set aside a specific number of spots for racial minorities, it could take
race inro account in its admission decisions . In choosing among qualified
candidates, Justice Powell held that "race or ethnic background may be deemed
a 'plus' in a particular applicant's file."" This part of his opinion was joined by
the other four justices, meaning five justices held that universities could take
race into account in their admissions decisions.
68

Supra note! at 359.

69

TIde: VI states: "No person in the United Scates shall. on the ground of race, color or

national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected
to

discriminatio n under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance."

42 U.S.c. §2000d.
70 Supranocc 1 at421.
71 Id at 320.
72 Id at 311.
73 Idat314.
74 Idat3 17.
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The result of the Bakke decision was that, while universities could take race into
account as one factor in admissions, they could not impose racial qUotas. In
essence, this allowed universities to continue their affirmative action ptograms.
While some critics thought there was no essential difference berween a racial
quota and treating race as one factor among many,'S the decision gave a little
something to each side. Opponents of affirmative action could point to the
holding that racial quotas denied applicants the equal protection of the laws,
while supporters could reply that it was constitutional for a university to take
race Into account.

Why did the justices adopt this position? Certainly the language of the
Constitution did not compel the result. The best answer, I think, is that the
decision reflected a political compromise berween contending forces. The New
Deal coalition was split. There was little public opinion polling on the issue,
but from the scant evidence that was available, the public seemed both unsure
and divided in its views.' 6 The brief filed by the U.S. government argued for
the constitutionality of taking race into account but pretty much avoided the
issue of racial quotas, mentioning opposition to it only in passing." A split
and unsure society produced a split opinion.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AFTER BAKKE
The Bakke decision, as might be expected, did not end the controversy over
affirmative action. Affirmative action programs had also been adopted by
governments at different levels to increase the number of minorities receiving
government contracts. The city of Richmond, Virginia, adopted such a
plan, giving preference to minority-owned businesses in the awarding of city

75

Justice Blackmun, for example. in his Bakktopinion , wrote that he didn't find the difference
"very profound or constitutionally significant." Id. at 406.

76

Charlotte Stech and Maria Krysan . The Polls - Trends Affirmative Action and the
Public/970-J995 60 PUBLIC OPINION QUARTERLY 128-158 {l996).
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The "Constiturion permits a professional school to seck to achieve reasonable goals or

targets (in contrast to ri gid exclus iona ry quotas) for minority admissions ... " Brief for the
United States as Amicus Curial', Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 1977
U.S. S. Ct. BrieFs LEXIS 143 at 94.
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contracts. In City of Richmond v. j.A. Croson Co. ,7' the Co urt held that this
program violated the Equal Protection Clause. In writing for the Court, Justice
O'Connor applied the strict scrutiny standard. However, there were several
concurring opinions, making it somewhat unclear whethe r the majoriry of
justices would apply strict scrutiny to affirmative action plans.
The question was settled in Adarand v. Pma (1995) ,7' another case about
preferences for minoriry-owned businesses, this time by the federal government.
Writing for herself and four other justices, Justice O'Conno stated:

"we hold today that all racial classifications, imposed ~y whatever
fidera!, state, or local governmmtal actor, must be analyzed by a
reviewing court under strict scrutiny. In other words, such classifications
are constitutional only if they are narrowly tailored measures that
forther compelling governmmtal interests. 'tiO
However, Justice O 'Connor made the explicit point that: adopting strict
scrutiny didn't automatically mean that all affirmative action plans would be
found unconstitutional. Towards the end of her opinion, she wrote, "we wish
to dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is 'strict in theory, but fatal in fact. " '81
The Adarand case was also notable for the concurring opinion ofJustice Thomas, the
only African-American member of the Court. One of the Court's most conservative
members, Justice Thomas equated affirmative action with segreganon and apartheid.
He wrote, "I believe that there is a 'moral [and) constitutional equivalence' ...between
laws designed to subjugate a race and those that distribute benefits on the basis
of race in order to foster some current notion of equaliry."" For Justice Thomas,
"government-sponsored racial discrimination based on benign prejudice is just as
noxious as discrimination inspired by malicious prejudice. In each instance, it is
racial discrimination, plain and simple."" In response, Justice Stevens rejected:
78
79
80
81
82
83

488 U.S. 469 (1 989).
515 U.S. 200 (1 995).
Id. ar 227.
Id. ar 237.
Id. ar 240.
Id. ar 241.
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"Justice Thomas' extreme proposition - that there is a moral and constitutional
equivalence between an attempt ro subjugate and an attempt ro redress the
effects of a caste system ... "84 Acknowledging rhar rhere are "many responsible
arguments" against affirmative action programs, Justice Stevens rejected the
argument that "equate[dl the many well-meaning and intelligent lawmakers
and their constituents ... who have supported affirmative action over the years,
to segregationists and bigots."85
What led the Supreme Court to adopt the stricr scrutiny standard for evaluating
the constitutionality of affirmative action under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment? One powerful answer comes from the attitudinal
model of judicial decision making.
The attitudinal model of judicial decision-malcing was created by Political
Scientists Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth in the 1980s. It posits that when
justices are faced with a legal issue, the most important factor leading to their
decision is neither the Constitution, nor the law, nor precedent, nor legal
argument. In fact, it isn't legal at all! The factor is their poliey preferences.
According to the attitudinal model, justices chose the outcome they prefer
and then find the appropriate legal arguments to support it. In two books,86
they make the case that the attitudinal model better explains the outcomes of
Supreme Court cases than does any appeal to the law.
One of the challenges in applying the attitudinal model is to find a measure of
each justice's policy preferences. The measure must be independent of their votes
in cases; otherwise, the logic is circular. A judge might vote in a consistently
liberal or conservative direction across a number of related cases, not because
she is liberal or conservative, but rather because she is applying a principled
jurisprudential approach.
84

Id

at

248.

85 Id
86 JEFFREY A SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME CoURT ANO THE ArrrruDlNAL MODEl
(I 993);JEFFREY A SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME CoURT AND THE ArrrruDlNAL
MODElREvtSITED (2002). S« abo, Jeffrey A Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, The Injluence o[Starr
Decisu on the Votes 0[U.s. Suprrme Court Justices 40 AM. J. POl. SCI. 971 (I 996).
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There are two main approaches ro discerning a justice's policy preferences. The
first is based on coding newspaper editorials in two generally liberal and two
generally conservative newspapers from a time a justice is nominated by the
President, to the time the Senate votes ro confirm the nomi nee. A score is then
created for each justice, from 0 to I, with 0 being a perfect conservative and
1 being a perfect liberal. In a 1989 journal article, Political Scientists Jeffrey
Segal and Albert Cover employed this methodology to study the voting records
of the seventeen justices nominated between 1954 and 198B, that is, from the
nomination of Early Warren in 1954 through the nomination of Anthony
Kennedy in 1988. 87 They then explored how each justice voted in cases involving
civil liberties, civil rights, criminal procedure, freedom of speech, due process
and privacy. Based on just the scores they developed from the newspaper
editorials, they correctly predicted 80% of the VOtes! ExcludingJustice Harlan,
they correctly predicted 86% of the votes. In other words, without knowing the
facts of a case, the relevant constitutional or staturory provisions, the related
precedents, the briefs or oral arguments - in faCt, without knowing anything
about a case other than what area of law it involved - the attitudinal model
correctly predicted close to 90% of the justices' votes .

As impressive as the results of the Segal-Cover scores are, the methodology is
cumbersome. A second, albeit crude, measure of a justice's policy preferences
is to use the political parry of the President who appoints a justice as a proxy.
The idea here is that presidents almost always appoint members of their own
parry ro the Supreme Courr. Further, the intuition is that Democrats and
Republicans have different policy preferences, particularly 011 issues such as of
civil rights and civil liberties, women's rights, privacy, the rights of workers,
the rights of criminal defendants, environmental protection and government
regulation more generally. At first glance, this measure seems too crude.
Political parries in the U.S. are traditionally seen as being big tents, covering a
wide vatiery of viewpoints. However true this may be, using the pol itical party
of the Pres ident as a proxy for a justice's policy preferences is a surprisingly

87

Jeff~ey A. Segal and A1berc D. Cover, Ideological Villues and the Vilus o/US. Sunrrme COli t
jumm 83 AM . POL. SCI. REv. 557 (I 989).
r
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powerful predictor of how they vote. This holds true even at the appellate level
where judges are constrained by Supreme Court precedent. Cass Sunstein and
colleagues undertook a major study of nearly 15,000 votes of judges of the
U.S. Courts of Appeals actoss thirteen areas oflaw, from 1995 to the early part
of the twenty-first century" They found statistically significant differences in
the votes of these judges in almost all the areas they examined, based solely on
the political party of the President who appointed them.
How does the attitudinal model help us to understand the Adarand decision?
Using the party of the appointing President as a proxy for the justices' policy
preferences, overall Republicans, including Republican Presidents, generally
oppose affirmative action, while Democrats, including Democratic Presidents,
generally suppOrt it. The five justices in the Adarand majority who adopted the
strict scrutiny standard were appointed by Republican Presidents Reagan and
George H. W Bush. In contrast, the two Justices appointed by a Democratic
President, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented. So, only knowing the
political party of the appointing President correctly predicts seven of the nine
votes. It does not, however, correctly predict the dissenting votes of Justices
Stevens and Sourer, appointed by Republican Presidents Ford and George H.
W. Bush, respectively. This is largely because both justices were more moderate
than typical Republican nominees. President Ford, in the wake of the Watergate
scandal, lacking elecrorallegitimacy'" and facing a Democrat-controlled Senate,
was in a weak political position. It is no surprise, then, that he nominated a
more moderate person. President Bush was influenced by his White House
Chief of Staff, John Sununu of New Hampshire, who supported David Souter,
also from New Hampshire. President Bush was also hoping to avoid a political
battle with the Democratic-controlled Senate. Again, the fact that Justice Sourer
was more moderate than the typical Republican appointee is no surprise.

88

Cass R. Sunstein , Schkade David & Lisa Michelle Ellman. Itkological v"ting on Fed"al
Courts orAppeals: A Preliminary Investigation 90 VA. L. REv. 301 (20 04) .
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Gerald Ford, {he Republican leader in the U.S. House of Representatives, was selected by
President Nixon m serve as Vice President after the resignation of {he elected Vice President

Spiro Agnew. When President Nixon resigned in 1974 , Vice· President Ford became President.
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Returning to affirmative action in education, while most colleges and universities
adopted affirmative action plans, they remained controversial for some people.
For example, the Law School at the University of Texas rook race into account
in its admission procedures. This practice was challenged by a white woman,
Cheryl Hopwood, and three whi te men who were denied admission to the law
school. They alleged that the law school's use of tace as one facror in admissions
violated the Equal Protection Clause. In 1996, the U.S. Co urt of Appeals for
the 5'" Circuit agreed. 90 Addtessing the Bakke decision and the issue of diversity,
the court held that "Justice Powell's view in Bakke is not binding precedent on
this issue" in part because "no othet Justice joined in that part of the opinion
discussing the diversity rationale."" The court then held that the correct
standatd ro apply ro evaluating the constitutionality of affirmative action was
sttict scrutiny. Applying that standard, the court held that "any consideration
of tace or ethnicity by the law school fot the purpose of achieving a diverse
student body is not a compelling intetest under the Fourteendl Amendment.""
In a sweeping conclusion, the court wrote:

''in summary, we hold that the University ofTexas School of Law may
not use race as a foetor in decidi ng which applicants to admit in order
to achieve a diverse student body. to combat the perceived effocts of a
hostile environment at the law school, to alleviate thr law sthool's poor
reputation in the minority community. or to eliminate any present
e!fiets ofpast discrimination by actors other than the law school. ''13
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court declined ro hear the case. The tesult was
that in the three states over which the U .S. Court of Appeals for the 5'h C ircuit
exercises jurisdiction, Louisiana, Mississippi and Texas, affitmative action was
unconstitutional.
Although Texas is a politically conservative state, many people wete troubled by
the drop in the enrollment of black and Hispanic students at the state's flagship
campuses, the University of Texas at Austin and Texas A & M University, in the
90 Hopwood v. Texas, 78 F. 3d 932 (5th Cir. 1996).
9 1 Id. at 944.
92 Id.
93 Id. at 962.
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wake of the Hopwood decision. In response, in 1997, the Texas legislature passed,
and Governor George W Bush signed, a bill that guaranteed admission to any
public university in Texas to any student who graduated in the top 10 percent of his
or her high school class. Given the racially segregated nature of many high schools
in Texas, it was widely believed that this "Top Ten Percent Plan" would increase
entollment of Hispanic and African-American students in Texas universities."

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CASES
The Supreme Court returned to the issue of affirmative action in university
admissions in 2003 when it heard two cases challenging affirmative actions
programs at [he University of Michigan " In Gratz v. Bollinger,96 [he COUrt
examined the constitutionality of the affirmative action program for admission
to the undergraduate program. In Gruffer v. Bollinger, 97 the focus was on the
affirmative action plan for admission to the Law School. The Gruffer opinion
discussed the issues in more depth.
The facts of Gruffer were similar to the facts of other affirmative action cases.
Barbara Grutter, a white applicant from Michigan, was denied admission to
the University of Michigan Law School, one of the highest ranking law schools
in the country. Because the Law School seeks "a mix of students with varying
backgrounds and experiences who will respect and learn from each other,"" it
adopted an affirmative action program. Under that program, the law school
takes account of "racial and ethnic diversity [in the admission process] with

94

95

For a helpful review of the Top Ten Percent Plan, see Nicholas Webster, Analysis ofrhr
Texas un Percent Plan, Kirwan Institute for the Study of Race and Ethnicicy, DEMOCRATIC
MERIT PROJECT. (The Ohio State University. Col umbus.2007).
Interestingly, these cases were part of a well-financed liti gat ion strategy to end affirmative

action led by the Center for Individual Rights, a conservative public-interest law firm
based in Washington , D.C. In additio n to orchestrating these cwo cases, it also was the
organization behind Cheryl Hopwood 's successful suit against the University of Texas.
See Wendy Parker, Th( Story of Grutter v. Bollinger: Affirmativ( Action Wins in MICHAEL
A. O LIVAS AND RONNAGREFF$C HNEIDEREDS, EDUCATION LAw STORI ES Ch. 4 (2007)
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special reference to the inclusion of students ftom groups which have been
historically discriminated ... against." The law school aims to enroll a '''cri tical
mass' of [under-represented] minority students" to "ensur[e] their ability to
make unique contributions to the character of the Law School. ""Gruttet
challenged this ptogram as denying her the equal protection of the laws in
violation of the 14'· Amendment.
Justice O'Connor, writing fot a five-vote majority, held that the appropriate
standa rd to evaluate the constitutionality of the ptogram was strict scrutiny.
Rejecting the notion that the strict scrutiny standard was "strict in theory,
but futal in fact,"' OO Justice O'Connor asked whether the law school had a
compelling interest in adopting its affirmative action plan . She found that it
did. That compelling interest was diversity: "we endorse J\Jstice Powell's view
[in Bakke] that student body diversity is a compelling stale interest that can
justify the use of race in university admissions."JOI This led to the next question
under the strict scrutiny standard: was the law school's affirmative action
program narrowly tailored to achieve its goal? Again, the majority held that it
was . "To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program cannot use
a quota system." Instead, a university may consider race or ethnicity only as a
"'plus' in a particular applicant's file," without "insulat[ing] the individual from
comparison" with all other candidates for the available seats 102 In other words,
un iversities can "consider race or ethnicity more flexibly as a 'plus' facror in the
context of individualized consideration of each and every applicant." Justice
O'Connor concluded that this was how the Michigan Law School's affirmative
action program worked: "the Equal Protection Clause does not prohibit the
Law School's narrowly tailored use of race in admissions d cisions to further
a compelling interest in obtaining the educational benefits that flow from a
diverse student body."'o,
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The result in Gratz was different, as was the University of Michigan's affirmative
action plan for undergraduate admissions. Under that plan, applicants were scored
on a point scale in which an applicant could score a maximum of 150 points. '04
Applicants from an "under-represented racial or ethnic minority group" were
automatically given 20 points. ' •5 Applicants who scored JOO points or higher
were admitted. 106 Jennifer Gratz, a white woman from Michigan who was denied
admission, challenged this affirmative action program as violating the Constitution
by denying her the equal protection of the laws. The Court agreed. Applying the
stria scrutiny standard, ChiefJustice Rehnquist held that the automatic distribution
of 20 points, one-fifth of the points needed for admission, did not provide the
individualized treatment that the Equal Protection Clause demanded. Thus,
the Court concluded, the affirmative action plan was "nor narrowly tailored ro
achieve the interest in educational diversity that respondents' claim justifies their
program."'·? Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment bur didn't join the Chief
Justice's opinion. lOB
How can the opinions in these cases be explained? Looked at from the vantage
point of the institutional model, they reflect the split nature of public opinion
on the issue. According to the Gallup Poll in 2001, 47% of Americans favored
affirmative action programs for minorities while 44% opposed them.
In
2003, the year of these decisions, 49% of respondents supported such programs
with 43% opposed. II. By splitting the difference, upholding the law school's
affirmative action plan and striking down the undergraduate plan, the Court can
be seen as giving each side a victory, in effect offering a political compromise.

I.'

104
105
106
107
108

Supra note 96 at 255 .
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Id. at 281.
109 Jeffrey M. Jones, Race, [tkolog}, and Support for Affirmative Action Personal Politics has
Little to do with Blacks'Support, GALLUP POLL (Aug. 232005) available at http: //www.
gallup.com! poIIl18091 ! Race-ldeology-Su pport -Affirmative-Action .asp •.
110 [d. SuppaH for affirmati ve action does vary by race , with Afri can-Americans
overwhelmingly supportive and whites fairly evenly split. In 2005 for example. 72%
of African-Americans favored affirmative action programs, while, among whites. 4 9%
opposed such programs compared to 44% who supported them.
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The attitudinal model does less well in explaining the results. In Gruffer, it
successfully predicts the votes of the four Republican-appointed justices who
dissented, as well as the two Democrat-appointed justices who voted to uphold
the program. However, they were joined by three-Republican appointees, Justices
O'Connor, Stevens and Souter. Earlier in the article, I discussed why Justices
Stevens and Souter might be expected to be more moderate O il affirmative action
than mher Republican appointees. The same is uue ofJustice O'Connor. When
he ran for President, Ronald Reagan pledged to appoint the first woman to the
Supreme Court. When the opportunity arose, he discovered that, as a result of
pervasive sex discrimination in legal education and the legal profession, there were
nm many qualified woman from which to choose. This was particularly true on
the Republican side. So, as the first woman appointed to the Supreme Court,
Justice O'Connm was more moderate than the typical Republican appointee.
Indeed, her Segal-Cover score made her the most moderate Re ublican appointee
on the Court, almost as close to democrat-appointee Stephen Breyer as to her
closest Republican-appointed fellow justice, Anthony Kennedy.
There is a third model of judicial decision-making that Polit ical Scientists have
developed - the Suategic Actor Model. It is most closely associated with the
work of Lee Epstein and Jack Knight. In The Choices Justi ces M ake, Epstein
& Knight write that the "suategic account of judicial decision making comprises
three main ideas : [1 ] justices' actions are directed toward the attainment of goals,

[2] justices are suategic and , [3] institutions structure justices' interactions." 'lI
In keeping with the atti tudinal mode, Epstein & Knight accept the premise
that "justices, fi rst and foremost, wish to see their policy preferences etched into
law.""2 In keeping with the public opinionlinstitutional model , Epstein & Knight
also accept the premise that courtS lack the power to implement their decisions
and are heavily dependent on the support of others. Where e Suategic Actor
Model differs from the Attitudinal Model is in its second premise, that judges are
constrained in their ability to enact their policy preferences by their colleagues, the
rules of the court in which they serve and the lack of power ofjudicial institutions.
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As they write, "justices are strategic actors, who realize that their ability to achieve
their goals depends on a consideration of the preferences of others, of the choices
they expect others to make, and of the institutional context in which they act. " 113
If a justice simply voted her sincere preferences, as the Attitudinal Model predicts,
she might be the sole dissenter in a case. It takes a majority of judges on a court
to set precedent. Thus, a strategic judge will comptomise, selecting the outcome
closest to her preferred policy posirion for which she can win a majority of her
colleagues' votes. Similarly, a judge may realize that her preferred policy position
lacks support among those political actors, interest gtoups, administrators, and the
public whose support is essential for the decision to be implemented. Once again,
the Strategic Actor Model predicts that a judge will comptomise her position to
select the outcome closest to her preferred policy position that is most likely to
be implemented.
In practice, there is a good deal of evidence supporting the Strategic Actor
Model. To explore the plausibility of the Model, the authors focused on the
157 cases that were orally argued in the U.S. Supreme Court's 1983 term
and that were listed in Justice Brennan's register. I I ' They also examined the
private papers of Justices Brennan, Douglas , Marshall and Powell. In addition,
they undertook similar investigation of 125 landmark opinions issued by the
Supreme Court over the Court's 1969-1985 terms. Much of what they found
supported the premise that justices acted strategically so as to build majorities
for their preferred policy positions.
Among the findings was evidence that the justices were aware of the views of
political elites, interest groups and public. For example, in the justices' files, they
found newspaper editorials and stories about current and past cases. I I S They
found that in most cases, at least one brief provided this information. I I G Further,
more than three-fourths of briefs indicated the views of the other branches of

I I3 [d. at 10.

11 4 [d at xiv.
11 5 Id at 145.
116 ld at 145-47.
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government. 117 And, in more than half the cases at the justices' conference, at
least one Justice mentioned the position of other branches of government. I 18
The Strategic Actor Model finds suppOrt in the Grutter decision. While the
attitudinal model might have predicted that the University of Michigan's plan
would be invalidated, the Strategic Actor Model looks to factors other than
the justices' policy preferences. Eighty-four amicus briefs were filed in the case.
Sixty-nine of them supported the University and its affirmative action plan,
eleven supported Grurrer and four supported neither party. I " Among the briefs
supporting affirmative action were ones ftom 13,922 current law students,
twenty-eight of the leading liberal arts colleges in the countly, most of the Ivy
League colleges and universities and several other leading universities, such as
the University of Chicago, Stanford, and M IT. Importantl)" there was a brief
filed by sixty-five Fortune 500 companies in support of affirmative action. The
General Motors Corporation filed a brief in support of affirmative action, as
did DuPont and IBM . Also importantly, twenty-nine retire military leaders,
including former high-ranking officers and civilian leaders of all branches of the
U. S. military, Secretaries of Defense, and present and former members of the
U.S. Senate who had military careers filed a briefin support of affirmative action.
These briefs, representing leaders in higher education, business, and the
military could have sent a powerful signal to the Court about their support
for affi rmative action. The justices might have concluded that a decision
invalidating all affitmative action would fly in the face of the practices ofleading
U.S. universities, corporations, and military leaders, practices said to be vital
to their mission and effectiveness. This is more than conjecture. Writing for
the Co urt in the Grutter decision, Justice O 'Connor took note of these briefs:

11 7 !d. at 147, Table 5-1.
118 !d. at 149.

119 List of the briefs and a summary of each of ,hem , available at np: llwww.vpcomm.
umich .edu/admiS5 ionsllegal/gru_amicus-ussdsummary.htmI.Link to each of {he briefs
supporting the University. avai/abk at hup:llwww. vpcomm.umich. edu/admissionsllegal!
gru_amicus-ussclum.h[ml.
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"major American businesses have made clear that the skills needed in
today's increasingly global marketplace can only be developed through
exposure to widely diverse people, cultures, ideas, and viewpoints. Brief
for 3M, et al. as Amici Curiae 5; Brieffor General Motors Corp. as
Amicus Curiae 3-4. What IS more, high-ranking retired officers and
civilian leaders ofthe United States military assert that, "[b}ased on
[their} decades of experience, " a "highly qualified, racially diverse
officer corps . .. is essential to the military's ability to fulfill its principle
mission to provide national security. " Brieffor Julius W Becton, Jr.,
et al. as Amici Curiae 5. "120
While supporters of the attitudinal model would likely suggest that Justice
O'Connor used these briefs to suppOrt and further her policy preferences.
her citations of them are at the very least compatible with the Strategic Actor
Model of judicial decision-making.

THE POST-UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN CASES
In 2007 the Supreme Court heard yet another affirmative action case dealing
with education. this time for elementary and high school students. In Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1. III the Court
heard constitutional challenges to "voluntarily adopted student assignment
plans that rely upon race to determine which public schools certain children
may attend" l22 in Seattle. Washington and Jefferson Counry (Louisville).
Kentucky. The idea behind the plans was to maintain racial integration in the
public schools and to prevent some of them ftom becoming all white or all
minority. In particular. Seattle was concerned that without such a plan. minority
students concentrated in low-income. minority neighborhoods would lack
access to the best schools. 123 These plans were challenged by Parents Involved
in Community Schools. a non-profit gtoUp that supported neighborhood
schools. As ChiefJustice Roberts explained. the suits were brought by " [pJarents

120 Supra note 97 at 330-31.

121 Supra note 79.
122 !d. at 709-10.
123 !d. at 712.
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of students denied assignment ro particular schools under these plans solely
because of their race ... contending that allocating children ro different public
schools on the basis of race violated the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of
equal protection."124 In operation, both plans had minim effects, involving
307 students in Seattle 125 and approximately three percent of school children
in Jefferson County.126
The Supreme Co urt invalidated both plans. Writing for only a plurality of the
Court, Chief Justice John Roberts rejected the diversity rationale of Gruffer,
holding that it was "unique to institutions of higher educat ion ."!'? He found
that the governmental interest in both cases was "racial balance" which was
not compelling under the strict scrutiny standard of the 14'1. Amendment. "In
design and operation," Roberts wrote, "the plans are directed only ro racial
balance, pure and simple, an objective this Court has repearedly condemned
as illegitimate."!" Further in his opinion, he noted that at the "heart of the
Constitution's guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not simply as components of a
racial, religious, sexual or national class. "!" To support this position, the Chief
Justice looked back ro the Brown decision, arguing it srood for the proposition
that school children could not, constirutionally, be treated differently on the
basis of race. Chief Justice Roberts wrote, "the position of the plaintiffs in
Brown was spelled out in their brief and could not have been clearer: [T)he
Fourteenth Amendment prevents states from according differential treatment to
American children on the basis of their color or race."!30 He then quoted Robert
Carter, one of the plaintiff's lawyers in Brown, who, in oral argument, had rold
the Court that his "one fundamental contention [was) that no State has any
124 !d.at710- 11.
125 !d. at 733 .
126 Id. at 734.
127 Id. at 724.
128 Id. at 726.
129 Id. at 730.

130 Id. at 747.
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authority under the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to
use race as a factor in affording educational opportunities among its citizens."13 '
The fifth vote for invalidating both affirmative action plans came from Justice
Kennedy. Unlike the plurality opinion, Justice Kennedy stressed the reality
of racial discrimination and unequal opportunities. "The enduring hope is
that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does" he wrote. 13'
In his view, the plurality opinion was "too dismissive of the legitimate interest
government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless of
their race. " 133 This meant for Justice Kennedy that a color-blind Constitution in
"the real world ... cannot be a universal constitutional principle."134 "Diversity,"
Justice Kennedy wrote, can be "a compelling educational goal a school district
may pursue." 135

Justice Kennedy concurred in the result, however, because he thought that
neither Seattle, nor Jefferson County had met its heavy burden under the strict
scrutiny standard of "justifYing its use of individual racial classifications." '36
But, this did not mean that race could never be used by school officials. "In
the administration of public schools by the state and local authorities," wrote
the Justice, "it is permissible to consider the racial makeup of schools and to
adopt general policies to encourage a diverse student body, one aspect of which
is its racial composition."137 The problem in these cases was the way in which it
was done. A "more nuanced, individual evaluation of school needs and student
characteristics that might include race as a component," 13' Justice Kennedy
wrote, "could be constitutional."

13 1 Id.

132
133
134
135
136
137
138

!d.
Id.
Id.
!d.
Id.
!d.

at 787.
at 787-88.
at 788.
at 783.
at 784.
at 788.

Id. at 790.
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The four dissenting justices were incensed at the way in which the Chief Justice
used the Brown decision to argue against affirmative action. The COntext of Brown
was that state and local officials used race to demean and stigmatize AfricanAmerican school children, separating them from white children. The aim of the
Brown decision was to help African-Americans to end their demeaning treatment.
Justice Stevens called it a "cruel itony"'" to turn Brown on it, head and use its
argument to stop voluntary efforts to provide equal opportuniry to all students.
As Justice Stevens pointed out, Chief Justice Roberts "milled] to note that it was
only black schoolchildren" who were unable to attend local schools. "[l ]ndeed,"
Justice Stevens wrote, "The history books do not tell stories of white children
struggling to attend black schools. " 140 For Justice Stevens, the Chief Justice's
opinion "rewrites the history of one of this Court's most important decisions."

I"

Justice Breyer agreed, calling it a "cruel distortion of history to compare Topeka,
Kansas, in the 1950's to Louisville and Seattle in the modern day-to equate the
plight of Linda Brown (who was ordered to attend a Jim Crow school) to the
circumstances of Joshua McDonald (whose request to transfer to a school closer
to home was initially declined)."142
To explain the decision in Parents Involved. one need not look much further than
the attitudinal model. The five justices who voted to invalidate the affir mative
actions plans were all appointed by Republican Presidents. Both Democrat
appointees, Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented with the support of the
two moderate Republican appointees, Justices Stevens and Souter. Since the
Michigan decisions in 2003 , two new Justices had joined the COUrt. Chief
Justice Roberts replaced Chief Justice Rehnquist who died, and Justice Alito
replaced Justice O 'Connor who retired. Ideologically, the Roberts for Rehnquist
replacement was a wash; the Alito for O 'Connor was a conservative move. The
Court that heard Parents Involvedwas a more conservative body than the Court
that heard the Michigan affirmative action cases.
139 !d at 799.
140 Id.
141 Id.

142 Id. at 867.
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In the wake of Parents Involved, it appeared that the constitutionality of
affirmative action programs hung by a thread. Now, at least four justices even
believed that Brown v. Board ofEducation should be read to outlaw affirmative
action. Many people thought its future depended on the identity of the next
President and of the next justice to leave the Court, either through retirement
or death. If a Democrat President was elected in 2008 and one of the five most
conservative justices left the Court, the President would almost certainly appoint
a Justice who would uphold the constitutionality of affirmative action . On
the other hand, if a Republican was elected, and one of the four more liberal
justices left the Court, it was thought that all affirmative action plans would
be invalidated. In the 2008 Presidential election, the Democrats' candidate,
Senator Barack Obama was elected President. However, the two justices who
retired, Justices Souter and Stevens, came from the liberal wing of the Court.
Their replacements, Justices Sotomayor and Kagan, would presumably vote
the same way, leaving the Court's views of affirmative action unchanged.
On June 24, 2013, the U .S. Supreme Court an nounced its decision in yet
another affirmative action case involving the University of Texas. Fisher v. The
University of Texas l43 was a case brought by a white woman, Abigail Fisher,
who had been denied admission to the University of Texas. The University,
in order to produce a "critical mass" of minority students over and above the
numbers produced by the Top Ten Percent Plan, took race into account in
its admission facrors. Following the Supreme Court's holding in Grutter, the
University treated race as one factor among many in its admission decisions .
As Justice Kennedy wrote, the University used race as a "meaningful factor"l ..
in its admission decisions. Fisher challenged this use of race as denying her
the equal protection of the laws. The University's affirmative action plan was
upheld in the lower courts. Fisher appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
In predicting how the Court would decide the issue, all eyes were on Justice
Kennedy. Ifhe were to vote with his four other Republican-appointed colleagues
- Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Thomas and Alito - then it was
143 Supra 4.
144 Jd.
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widely believed affirmative action in universities would be ended. If he were to
vote with his Democrat-appointed colleagues who heard the case145 - Justices
Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor - then itwas widely believed affirmative action
would survive, at least for the time being. And, it was hard to know what Justice
Kennedy would do. On the one hand, he had dissented in the Grutter case which
upheld the use of race as one factor in admission decisions. O n the orher hand,
his concurrence in the more recent Parents Involved case suggested he might be
open to a narrowly tailored and carefully structured affirmative action program.
Justice Kennedy wrote the Court's opinion. H is opinion was Joined by all of his
colleagues except for Justice Ginsburg. The Court found that the lower courts
had not correctly applied the strict scrutiny standard. Under the Constitution
and the Court's precedents, Justice Kennedy wrote, "strict scrutiny imposes
on the university the ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turni ng to
racial classifications, that available workable race-neutral alternatives do not
suffice."!" In considering the constirutionality of the affirmative action plan,
the Court held that the lower courts had not subjected the University's plan
to this searching inquity. "The District Court and Court of Appeals confined
the strict scrutiny inquiry in roo narrow a way," Justice Ken nedy wrote, "by
deferring to the University's good faith in its use of racial classifications... "!17
Thus, the case was vacated and remanded to the Court of Ap eals to apply the
correct constitutional standard. 148
The Fisher decision left the co nstirutionality of affirmative action unsettled.
Why did the Court do this? One plausible explanation, of course, is that it
was the correct legal decision. If a lower court misapplies current doctrine,
145 The ninth Justice on the Supreme Coun, Ju stice Kagan. appoimed
President Barack Obama. recused herself.

by Democratic

146 Supra 4.

147 Id.
148 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the S'hCircuit held oral argument in Fishtro n November
13th, 2013. As of the date of th is publication. it had nor delivered its opinion. For coverage
o f the oral argument, see, Manny Fernandez, TO(as University's Ract Admissiom Po/icy Is
Dtbattd Btfort a Frrkral CourtNew Yo rk Times, November 14, 2013 . Available at http://
www.nyumcs.com/2 0 13/1 1/ 14/ usltexas-universirys-race-adm issi on'l-pol icy-is-debaredbefore-a-federal-coun .html?emc=edi cmt_20 131 1 14&mremailO=y.
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it is procedurally defensible to remand the case and order the lower court to
re-examine the issue. But, this seems too easy. The Court wasn't required to
hear the case. Typically, the COUrt acceprs a case for review if there is a conRict
among U.S . Courts of Appeals. That was not the case here. Another ground
for the Court to take a case is if the lower courts reject COUrt precedent or
make a major departure from current practice. Again, that was not the case
here. Under Court rules, it takes the votes of four justices for the Court to
accept a case. This suggests that the four conservative justices voted to hear
the case thinking they could win the vote of Justice Kennedy and produce a
Court opinion invalidating affirmative action once and for all. If so, it appears
they miscalculated. It may be the case that Justice Kennedy isn't yet prepared
to invalidate all use of race in university admissions. If he had been willing,
it seems virtually certain he would have been joined by his other Republicanappointed colleagues.
Another interesting question raised by the decision is why Justices Breyer
and Sotomayor, twO Democrat-appointed justices who had voted to uphold
affirmative action plans in the past, ' 49 joined the Court's opinion and not
Justice Ginsburg's dissent? One possible answer comes from the Strategic Actor
Model. If, as suggested above, they believed that the future of affirmative action
depended on Justice Kennedy's vote, then perhaps they were willing to support
him doing anything short of striking it down. They may have believed that a
remand was the best outcome they could hope for. Further, the remand buys
time. Perhaps one of the Republican-appointed justices will leave the Court
before the next affirmative action case reaches it?"OIf that were to happen,
and a Democrat was President, then there would very likely be live votes to
uphold affirmative action.

149 Justice Breyer concurred in the Gratz decision which invalida ted (he automatic point
system used in undergraduate admissions at the University of Michigan. The facts of
the Fisher cases, however, were much more similar to the use of race in Grutta, which
Justice Breyer supported.

150 Justices Scalia and Kennedy will both turn 78 in 2014.
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CONCLUSION
The U.S. Supreme COUrt is a political institution. Its members are selected and
appointed through a partisan political process. In contentious political issues,
it is presented with the ambiguous words of the U.S. Constitution . Through
amicus briefs, it learns the policy preferences of those individuals, institutions,
and organizations whose support is crucial if the Court'S decisions are to be
given more than lip service. Given this reality, it is naive to expect the justices
to be entirely removed from the society in which they live and the political
system of which they are members. Perhaps, in no substantive area is this truer
than in issues of discrimination, including affirmative action.
In examining how the Supreme Court reaches its decisions in affirmative action
cases, I have argued that three leading models of judicial decis ion-maki ng, the
attitudinal model, the strategic actor model and the institutional/public opinion
model shed a great deal oflight. They highlight how the policy preferences of
the justices, the constraints under which they operate, and the beliefs of white
elites and the white public more generally are powerful predictors of how cases
will be decided. If this is right, then the future of affirmative action depends
much more on politics and elections than it does on constitutional provisions,
precedents and legal interpretation. The future of affirmative action, then,
largely depends on which party wins the 2016 U.S. Presidential election. That
outcome, and not any legal argument, must be the focus of anyone who wishes
to understand the development of the U.S. Supreme Court·s jurisprudence in
affirmative action and, perhaps, in other contentious areas.

